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Out-of-order speculation, a technique ubiquitous since the
early 1990s, remains a fundamental security flaw. Via attacks
such as Spectre and Meltdown, an attacker can trick a victim,
in an otherwise entirely correct program, into leaking its
secrets through the effects of misspeculated execution, in
a way that is entirely invisible to the programmer’s model.
This has serious implications for application sandboxing and
inter-process communication.
Designing efficient mitigations that preserve the perfor-
mance of out-of-order execution has been a challenge. The
speculation-hiding techniques in the literature have been
shown to not close such channels comprehensively, allow-
ing adversaries to redesign attacks. Strong, precise guaran-
tees are necessary, but mitigations must achieve high per-
formance to be adopted. We present Strictness Ordering, a
new constraint system that shows how we can comprehen-
sively eliminate transient side channel attacks, while still
allowing complex speculation and data forwarding between
speculative instructions. We then present GhostMinion, a
cache modification built using a variety of new techniques
designed to provide Strictness Order at only 2.5% overhead.
1 Introduction
Speculative side-channel attacks such as Spectre [18] and
Meltdown [21] have severely damaged modern systems’ se-
curity: even functionally correct programs can be compro-
mised through the leakage of secrets via incorrectly predicted
program behaviour. Still, the side channels that cause this
leakage, for example caches, are desirable in many cases; the
speed of modern microarchitectures is only possible because
of structures that leak soft state. Out-of-order speculation,
which allows attackers to execute complex speculative code,
is mandatory for high instruction-level parallelism.
Many different mitigation techniques, with differing threat
models and security properties, have been proposed. Often
the tradeoffs are unclear, as the guarantees necessary, and
provided, are typically opaque. This has resulted in subtle
bugs in many proposed countermeasures. Since precise mod-
els of the behaviour guaranteed by mitigations are typically
unavailable, sophisticated attacks to circumvent restrictions,
such as SpectreRewind [10] and Speculative Interference [5]
have appeared to fill in the gaps. We now know that clean-
ing up the effects of speculation after it has occurred is
insufficient to prevent microarchitectural speculation attacks.
This means that speculation-hiding techniques in the litera-
ture [1, 27, 37, 38] leak, through inability to correctly handle
concurrent execution and incomplete coverage of microarchi-
tectural structures. Examples include but are not limited to al-
lowing structural hazards in non-pipelined divider units to be
caused by otherwise “invisible” speculative loads [10], and
can cause comprehensive breaches, and leave long-lasting
traces in otherwise protected cache systems [5]. Speculation-
restricting techniques [20,29,36,40], by comparison, prevent
many executions that are completely valid, with significant
performance loss for memory-intensive workloads.
We present Strictness Ordering, a permissive constraint
system that allows information (and side-channel) flow
in any situation where speculative operations that do not
commit can never leak to those that do. This is compli-
cated by the fact those instructions may execute concur-
rently [5,10], but can be expressed as a simple property (def-
inition 1). This allows significantly more freedom than only
allowing instructions to emit timing side-effects once non-
speculative [20, 29, 36, 40], because whether an instruction
commits or not is heavily tied with the fates of other con-
currently executing instructions. For example, instructions
in a pipeline only commit when all previous instructions in
program order do so, and so those previous instructions can
freely transmit data to, and take resources from, concurrently
executing future instructions.
We show how to build Strictness Ordering into microar-
chitecture with GhostMinion, a cache system and core mod-
ification designed to eliminate transient execution attacks
including Spectre [18], and associated derivatives includ-
ing SpectreRewind [10] and Speculative Interference [5].
Overheads from the cache modification are just 2.5% on
SPEC CPU2006, 0.6% on SPECspeed 2017, and negligible
on Parsec, and we argue that fixing other Strictness-Order
issues within the system are unlikely to have significant
overhead. GhostMinion defeats transient execution attacks
more comprehensively than previous speculation-hiding de-
fences [1, 11, 16, 27, 28, 37, 38], and without fully associative
overprovisioned structures [16, 38].
Our contributions are as follows:
• We define a timing model, Strictness Order, that if
obeyed can eliminate all forms of transient execution
attack, including backwards-in-time and contention at-
tacks [1, 5, 10], while still being highly permissive to
innocuous forms of information flow and out-of-order
execution.
• We define Temporal Order as a simple overapproxima-
tion of Strictness Order.
• We develop GhostMinion, a cache system that uses
the new techniques of TimeGuarding, Lapfrogging and
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Timeleaping to enforce Temporal Order, and thus Strict-
ness Order, in the cache hierarchy.
• We implement or describe the extensions that would
be necessary to achieve Temporal Order and/or Strict-
ness Order for the entire system, for hypothetical at-
tacks that violate Strictness Order (via contention or
soft state) anywhere within a processor, and argue that
the techniques demonstrated by GhostMinion can be
used elsewhere and the additional overheads are likely
to be neglgible.
• We evaluate GhostMinion in gem5, showing overheads
of only 2.5% geomean for SPEC CPU2006, 0% for
Parsec, and 0.6% for SPECspeed 2017.
1.1 Threat Model
We assume the existence of an attacker, trying to leak se-
cret data through transient (misspeculated) execution. They
will succeed if they can change the execution time of any
committed instruction at any point before, during or after the
misspeculation, via a transient access of the secret they are
trying to leak. This measurement includes but is not limited
to the execution time of instructions that directly measure
time, such as rdtsc. The attack may be via attacks such
as Spectre [18], where no explicit exceptional behaviour is
triggered by the misspeculation, or attacks such as Melt-
down [21] or Foreshadow [9] where exceptional behaviour
is incorrectly temporarily ignored by the speculative exe-
cution, which can be fixed more directly. When we refer
specifically to Spectre, we do so because it requires more
all-encompassing strategies for defence, and without loss of
generality.
We do not necessarily require the attacker to successfully
bring in or evict data from any observable cache past the
point of misspeculation. This is because recent attacks [10]
are able to measure secrets just from the effects on concur-
rently executing instructions, and such contention effects are
able to be converted into long-lasting state changes [5].
We assume the attacker is able to run arbitrary code, but
cannot load secret data directly; e.g., they are within a sand-
box either in userspace or the kernel, sharing an address
space with the secret but with runtime checks preventing
access. The attacker could also reside in another process [1],
or on another system entirely [31].
2 Background
2.1 Spectre
Spectre [18] uses transient misspeculation of a processor,
such as from a mistrained branch predictor or branch target
buffer, to accesse information that the correct execution of
the program would not. This can be used by an attacker to
trick a victim into loading secret data, for example by ignor-
ing safety checks on inputs or within sandboxes. Though
the execution is rolled back, it may leave traces within soft-
state structures such as caches, which can be measured using
timing side channels to reveal the secret.
In the original Spectre proof-of-concept [18], the attacker
collects secret data by using it to then trigger other transient
loads into the cache based on using the secret value as an
index. This is followed by measuring which cache lines
have been brought into the cache once correct execution
restarts, in an evict-and-time attack, or evicted, via a prime-
and-probe attack. This gave rise to defences that cleared up
misspeculation effects after discovery [1, 11, 27, 28, 37].
2.2 Backwards-in-Time Attacks
Post-misspeculation rollback is insufficient against attacks
that rely on changing the timing of committed instructions
before the misspeculation, such as SpectreRewind [10]. Out-
of-order processors execute many instructions in parallel.
Though the frontend fetches instructions in sequence, and
the backend retires them in sequence, in the middle, opera-
tions that do not commit (and are misspeculated) can occur
before those that do, which are earlier in program order.
SpectreRewind [10] uses misspeculation to change the tim-
ing of these logically earlier (but executed later) instructions,
by causing structural-hazard contention in non-pipelined di-
vider units. Speculative Interference [5] takes this one step
further: it notes that these timing effects on logically earlier
instructions can actually change the order in which instruc-
tions execute, causing different state to be stored in the cache
system, and thus leaving a long-lasting trace of behaviour
that can later be picked up by an attacker. The effect is not
limited to non-pipelined functional units; equivalent con-
tention can be caused by transient instructions bringing data
into, or evicting data from, the cache for earlier concurrently
executing instructions to use [1]. Clearing state changes on
the discovery of misspeculation [1, 11, 27, 28, 37] is insuffi-
cient: side channels can travel backwards in time to cause
equivalent damage.
3 Strictness Ordering
Speculative-execution attacks cause measurable behaviour
that can be exploited to retrieve secrets. This is achieved
by causing transient instructions, which would never be exe-
cuted without the presence of misspeculation, to affect the
timing of other instructions that are otherwise correct. To
complicate this, instructions within a pipeline are not cleanly
split up in to “transient” and “non-speculative”, where the
latter can transmit to any instruction and the former cannot:
instead, a pipeline is filled with instructions from progressive
levels of speculation. During execution it is typically un-
known how far down the path of instructions we will commit
before a transient misspeculation, and instruction flush, will
occur.
Still, we must not be overly restrictive, in capturing in-
nocuous transmission between instructions that cannot leak
transient execution to committed state. To directly capture
the threat of instructions that do not commit affecting the
timing of those that do, we define a new timing influence
model that must be obeyed to prevent speculative timing-
side-channel attacks (definition 1).
Definition 1 (Strictness Ordering). Let x and y denote
executed instructions. Under Strictness Ordering, y
can strictly observe x (x S=⇒ y), meaning x can impact
the execution time (cycle of any pipeline stage) of y, iff
commit(y)→ commit(x)
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where commit(i) is true iff instruction i is guaranteed
to reach the end of the CPU pipeline without being
squashed, or already has, and→ is logical implication.
In other words, for y to observe any timing change from
the execution of x, y must be an instruction that is always
squashed whenever x is squashed, or x must be an instruc-
tion that will not be squashed (or has already committed).
Intuitively, this can be viewed as preventing timing side-
channel effects from flowing backwards-in-time from more
speculative to less speculative instructions.
To prove this is sufficient to eliminate transient side-
channel attacks, suppose x is an instruction that is part
of a transient-execution gadget: it can observe secret
data D that is inaccessible under correct execution, and
thus never commits, so ¬commit(x). Since x does not
commit, neither will any instructions that depend on
it, and so D may only be recovered via a (timing) side
channel. If we assume the attack succeeds, some in-
struction y exists, such that commit(y) holds, that has
its timing impacted by the execution of x to measure
the channela. For that to have occured, x S=⇒ y holds
by definition, and so commit(y)→ commit(x). Since
commit(y) is true, commit(x) must also hold. How-
ever, since x is transient, ¬commit(x) also holds, and
we have a contradiction: no transient x that can transmit
data to a committed instruction via timing side channel
exists.
aThis may be a timer such as rdtsc, or be based on the com-
mit time of an instruction with state, such as an incrementing
counter [30].
There are a number of properties that follow:
Every instruction that has already committed, or is guar-
anteed to commit, can transmit to any other. Side-
channel flow will always eventually be able to occur for
valid instructions executing in program-order, as a fallback
for more advanced reordering.
Within a thread and pipeline, for any two instructions a
and b, either a S=⇒ b, b S=⇒ a, or both. Assume that, as is
typical, an out-of-order processor issues instructions (spec-
ulatively) in order at the front-end, and that misspeculation
is handled by restarting the pipeline at the last known cor-
rect instruction in program order. It follows that there is a
total order on instructions that commit: for an instruction to
commit, all earlier instructions issued in program order must
also do so, thus at least one of commit(a)→ commit(b) or
commit(b)→ commit(a) holds. This allows us to be more le-
nient than waiting for instructions to become non-speculative,
because it always allows older instructions to immediately
transmit to newer instructions in program order, even while
speculative.
The relation is transitive. Imagine that a transient instruc-
tion x affects the execution time of an instruction y that will
commit. Even if the commit time of y is unchanged, and no
directly visible side channel occurs, if the result forwards to
another committed instruction z, which then commits earlier
as a result, a side channel becomes visible. These transi-
tive effects make it sufficient for Strictness Order to only
Figure 1: An example of ordering restrictions. Instructions
in green are non-speculative, as are those in grey, which are
held up by the load’s cache miss. Instructions following
the grey branch are speculative. Instructions in red (with
hatching) cannot affect the timing of the instruction in white
before becoming non-speculative, whereas instructions in
blue may do so: under Strictness Order, any load before the
blue branch can forward data to, or evict data seen by, the
instruction in white, or contend for the same resource. By
contrast, preventing speculation (Block Speculative) disal-
lows many valid flows, whereas a baseline Unsafe system
allows transient execution attacks, by making the effects of
operations that do not commit, and can access data disal-
lowed by correct execution, visible to other instructions.
maintain that the commit time of committed instructions to
be unaffected rather than execution time per se, as a change
in execution time of one instruction can be converted to a
change in commit time of another if it has the potential to
become visible. Still, to avoid having to consider this transi-
tive impact, it is simpler to design hardware that preserves
guarantees over all execution time: that is, at no pipeline
stage should the effects of a transitive instruction alter the
timing of an instruction that may later be committed.
Between threads, no such program ordering holds. For
two instructions in two threads xT 1 and yT 2, xT 1 6
S
=⇒ yT 2 and
yT 2 6
S
=⇒ xT 1 may both hold. Indeed, there is unlikely to be any
reason for an ordering outside a guarantee of commit: timing
information from yT 2 can typically only be transmitted to
T 1 once the yT 2 instruction becomes non-speculative.
The result is a preorder relation1, demonstrated in fig. 1,
which allows significantly freer execution than many previ-
ous techniques [20, 29, 36, 40], without affecting security.
Outside of its basic definition, for the Strictness Order
property to be enforceable, two other properties are assumed.
First, speculative execution can only be measured by tim-
ing impact on at least one valid instruction. Outside of access
to advanced performance counters, this is typically true. Sec-
ond, if y 6 S=⇒ x, then as well as x’s execution time, y must also
not be able to affect whether x commits. A speculative tech-
1Strictness Order is named after, and closely related to, strictness analy-
sis [24], an optimisation in software to transform call-by-need into call-by-
value. A function f is strict in an input x if the function fails to terminate
whenever the input fails to terminate. In the same way, an instruction y can
strictly observe an instruction x under Strictness Order if whenever x fails
to commit, y fails to commit.
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nique, that assumed y S=⇒ x and rolled back and re-executed x
if incorrect, would affect the timing of the program based on
the behaviour of y, an instruction that was never committed.
Strictness Ordering is sufficient to comprehensively pre-
vent any transient execution attack, regardless of whether
the effects are timed at any point after correct execution
has restarted [5, 18, 21] or whether the observed effects are
entirely concurrent contention and do not persist past the
return to correct execution [5]. This is because no misspec-
ulated operation can ever affect the execution time of any
committed instruction at any point.
Definition 2 (Temporal Ordering). Let x and y denote
executed instructions. Under Temporal Ordering, y
temporally succeeds x (x T=⇒ y), meaning x can impact
the execution time of y, iff
commit(x)∨ seq(x,y)
where commit(i) is true iff instruction i will reach the
end of the CPU pipeline without being squashed, or
already has, seq(x,y) indicates that x occurs before y
in the program’s instruction sequence, and ∨ is logical
disjunction.
A simple overapproximation of Strictness Order is Temporal
Order (definition 2). This considers each new instruction
as more speculative than the last. This is more lenient than
in-order execution, or blocking all speculative computation
(Block Speculative in fig. 1), as it only prevents information
flow (side channels or otherwise) in reverse. Execution can
otherwise still occur out-of-order. For typical out-of-order
systems, which re-execute instructions past misspeculation,
a Temporal-Order microarchitecture obeys Strictness Order:
since there is a total order on instructions that commit within
a thread, seq(x,y)→ (commit(y)→ commit(x)), and by log-
ical tautology, commit(x)→ (commit(y)→ commit(x)). In-
structions can be treated as speculative until they reach com-
mit, and each new instruction can be treated as more spec-
ulative than the last. GhostMinion implements Temporal
Order for simplicity, and because the overapproximation
causes little performance loss even though it rejects some
valid orderings. The difference is shown in fig. 1.
4 GhostMinion
Here we develop GhostMinion, an extension to the cache
system and core to enforce Temporal Ordering (definition 2),
and thus Strictness Ordering (definition 1) as a result. A
summary is shown in fig. 2: we cache the results of specula-
tive memory accesses in a compartment of the L1 cache,
labelled a GhostMinion. These are only allowed to im-
pact state within the rest of the cache system (the non-
speculative cache hierarchy) once an instruction becomes
non-speculative. Within the GhostMinion, instructions may
be forbidden from seeing eviction or insertion of others,
depending on their Strictness Order (figs. 3 and 4). The
enforcement of this is guaranteed by TimeGuarding, which
directly translates Temporal Order into hardware. Transient
contention in the rest of the system, such as the miss-status
handling registers (MSHRs) or non-pipelined instructions,
is also subject to TimeGuarding, or when more appropri-
ate leapfrogging (fig. 5), which allows stealing of resources,
followed by replay of the offending operation, to prevent
breaking Strictness Order under greedy out-of-order resource
allocation.
4.1 How to Achieve Strictness Ordering
Suppose we have two instructions, x and y, where x is a
misspeculated instruction transmitting via side channel to y,
which has, or will be, committed. There are three cases: y
commits before x enters the pipeline, y is issued after x is
flushed, or both are in the pipeline concurrently.
The first case is trivial. If y commits before x enters the
pipeline, then no timing information from x could ever reach
y. The second is also relatively simple: we must clear any
state changes that were caused by misspeculation before
restarting correct execution. In order to not affect the timing
of future committed instructions, thus violating Strictness
Order, this rollback to a misspeculation-free state must be
timing-invariant to the content, or volume of content, that
needs to be cleaned up. This means that allowing misspec-
ulation to propagate through a cache system, followed by
(serially) undoing [27, 37] the results would violate Strict-
ness Order, resulting in a side channel. Instead, we must
make this rollback time-invariant [1] and efficient, by lim-
iting speculative changes to a small region of SRAM (the
GhostMinion).
The final case, where x and y execute concurrently, is that
exploited by techniques such as SpectreRewind [10] and
Speculative Interference [5]. Since both are in the pipeline
simultaneously, and y will be committed but x will not, we
know that y is before x in (speculative) program order, and
that y S=⇒ x but x 6 S=⇒ y. Still, y may be delayed from being
a candidate for execution, and so x may execute first. To
enforce Strictness Order, x’s execution must not be visible by
timing y. Not only must we keep speculative resources con-
fined to a GhostMinion: we must also prevent any backwards-
in-time channels before misspeculation is detected. Under
Temporal Order, which treats instructions as a sequence,
older instructions in program order must not be able to read
data brought in by logically newer instructions, and so must
observe a cache miss in the GhostMinion (fig. 4a). Newer
instructions also cannot evict the data of an older instruction,
and so a fill must fail if there are no storage options left
within a GhostMinion cache set that do not violate this con-
straint (fig. 4b). Resource contention must also be hidden,
and so older instructions can steal contended resources taken
by newer instructions, which must then repeat (fig. 5).
4.2 Overview
GhostMinions are placed next to the L1, and accessed in
parallel with the L1. They buffer speculative accesses from
the rest of the memory hierarchy, which cannot be altered by
speculative evictions or fills. The non-speculative cache hier-
archy may follow any inclusion or exclusion policy, but must
be non-inclusive non-exclusive with respect to the Ghost-
Minion to avoid information leakage.
The non-speculative cache hierarchy never sees state
changes from speculative instructions, and so no rollback is
required for them on misspeculation. Only the GhostMinion
is wiped on misspeculation, and only it needs restrictions on
its data forwarding (fig. 4). Changes in the non-speculative
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Figure 2: GhostMinion attaches to each L1 cache, and is
designed to cache speculative loads, with TimeGuarding to
make this data (and any eviction) invisible under concurrent
misspeculation. To hide contention, timestamp metadata
propagates into the MSHRs at each cache level, allowing
loads to be cancelled and replaced (leapfrogging).
cache hierarchy can only occur through non-speculative
memory accesses (such as the head of the reorder buffer),
through a committed instruction moving data out of the
GhostMinion (fig. 3), or through the actions of a prefetcher.
Still, GhostMinions share the L1’s miss status handling reg-
isters (MSHRs), and use the L2 and L3’s MSHRs, which
though they are transient, can cause contention-based timing
flow without care. To avoid this, we propagate Temporal
Order throughout the MSHR hierarchy, in particular using
leapfrogging (fig. 5) to steal resources back when the ex-
istence of a partially complete memory access would leak.
GhostMinions cannot cause deadlock or livelock, as all valid
instructions become non-speculative, and thus globally visi-
ble, once they reach the head of the reorder buffer.
GhostMinions are wiped on misspeculation, in a timing-
invariant way, to clear all timestamps above the point of
misspeculation2. This is done in a single cycle using parallel
registers [1], separate from the L1 cache, which indicate
validity and timestamp. GhostMinions do not hold dirty data,
and so no writeback is required on this invalidate operation.
In addition, to prevent Temporal-Order violation from con-
current execution, constraints on forwarding and evicting
data in a GhostMinion must hold: these are explored below.
4.3 Free-Slotting
A speculative overwrite (by an instruction x), within the
GhostMinion, of data brought in by an instruction z that has
committed, is forbidden, as this would result in a backwards-
in-time channel by evicting the non-speculative data. Pre-
cisely, a speculative instruction y, where z T=⇒ y T=⇒ x, but
x 6 T=⇒ y, may then try to read the original, now-evicted cache
line from z. What follows is that, in order to bring data
into a GhostMinion, we can only overwrite free slots or
data that is more speculative than the current load. To avoid
resource starvation, when we write a cache line into the non-
speculative L1 on commit, we must also evict it from the
GhostMinion to create a free slot for speculative memory
accesses (fig. 3). If the cache system guarantees either exclu-
2Unlike in MuonTrap [1], we do not clear all data from the GhostMinion,
as this could violate Temporal Order if the discovered misspeculation is
itself speculative (e.g. because a misspeculated branch C relies on a yet-to-
be-resolved branch B).
Figure 3: On commit of a load, the GhostMinion is checked
for any cached line that matches, and can be validly read
in Strictness Order by the committed instruction based on
its timestamp (TS). If found, it is written to the L1, and
evicted from the GhostMinion, leaving a “free slot” for future
speculative loads to fill without evicting non-speculative
data.
sion or inclusion for the non-speculative hierarchy, then the
line is kept in the GhostMinion until the data can be moved
to the L1 while preserving this invariant, to service requests
while exclusion or inclusion are enforced in the hierarchy.
Free-slotting is why GhostMinions are placed next to L1
caches, rather than closer to the CPU as in techniques such as
MuonTrap [1]. Since a GhostMinion does not store commit-
ted data, it no longer makes sense to use a GhostMinion as a
fast L0 cache for frequent lookups: instead, it should be ac-
cessed in parallel with the L1. This writeback-on-commit is
the only way data can escape to the outside world: otherwise,
it is thrown away, to avoid affecting other caches3.
4.4 TimeGuarding
To track Temporal Order, each issued instruction is assigned
a timestamp. This is attached to speculative memory ac-
cesses of the GhostMinion; a speculative load is only allowed
to read a value from the GhostMinion if its timestamp is
greater or equal than the value in the GhostMinion (fig. 4a).
A cache fill in the GhostMinion is only allowed if a) the
block is free, or b) the new request has a lower timestamp
than the block it wishes to evict (fig. 4b)4. Whether a suitable
space is available or not is dictated by the value of a given
address, assuming the structure is not fully associative, and
the number of sets available. If no sets can validly be used
within a given line without violating TimeGuarding, the
load is returned to the CPU without being written to the
GhostMinion: it will thus not be available to write back to
the L1 on commit.
Logically and behaviourally, the TimeGuard can be con-
sidered a timestamp increasing to infinity. Implementation-
3Nevertheless, the state of the non-speculative cache hierarchy can
validly be different from a sequential execution, but only in ways that do
not violate Temporal Order. For example, if instruction y at timestamp 43
fills the GhostMinion, then x at timestamp 42 fills to the same slot, which it
sees as free to preserve Timestamp Order. This means that y, never fills to
the L1 despite both being valid. This is permitted because, while x cannot
see the out-of-order effects of y, y is validly permitted see the out-of-order
effects of x. Thus, maintaining equivalent state to an in-order execution is
not necessary to maintain Temporal Order or Strictness Order.
4Any policy that does not reveal the difference between a) a “free slot”
and b) a location taken by a block at a higher timestamp, to an instruction
at a lower timestamp, is valid; we choose to take free slots if available,
and evict the highest-timestamped available location in a set otherwise.
This is because only the highest-timestamped instruction is aware that the
GhostMinion is in fact full.
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(a) Reads only succeed if the timestamp of a cache line is less than
or equal to the timestamp of the instruction. In this example, if the
load of 0x14 at timestamp 22 did not commit, but the same load at
timestamp 21 committed and observed 22’s cache line, this would
break Strictness Order. For the load of 0x15, the timestamp 28 is
higher than 27; the former cannot commit if the latter fails, so the
channel is permitted.
(b) Filling the GhostMinion is the opposite: it can only overwrite
data with a greater-than or equal timestamp (or a free slot).
Figure 4: To enforce Strictness Order, GhostMinion puts
TimeGuarding restrictions on which data can be read or
overwritten, to make the existence of concurrent misspecu-
lation invisible. This prevents any backwards information
flow, from existence or non-existence of data, and works
regardless of the associativity of the GhostMinion.
Figure 5: An example of leapfrogging. Here, no miss status
handling registers (MSHRs) in the cache are free. The read
request we are attempting has a timestamp of 25, and so can-
not affect the execution of the MSHR requests at timestamps
22 and 23. The timestamp 28 must be invisible to our current
request: the new read, at timestamp 25, replaces the one at
timestamp 28, which fails and must reattempt later.
wise, the maximum timestamp is sized to be twice the num-
ber of reorder-buffer entries, as a sliding window5.
4.5 Leapfrogging
GhostMinion allocates and schedules resources to instruc-
tions greedily. A speculative instruction y may be allocated
the last free MSHR in the cache, when an instruction x, be-
fore y in program order, becomes available to execute. If y
then delayed the execution of x, this would be a violation
of Temporal Order (and thus Strictness Order), and so to fix
this, x must be able to steal y’s MSHR from underneath it, in
a process called leapfrogging (fig. 5). This causes the load
5Since there will only ever be N maximum instructions in the reorder
buffer at once, allocated in timestamp order, each individual instruction can
only execute concurrently with 2N instructions. It is sufficient to allocate
timestamps in-order with a wrap-around at 2N, and gives the constraint that
an instruction at timestamp t can only overwrite a cache line at timestamp
t..((t +N) mod (2N)), and only read all others.
for y to lose its MSHR resource; the core treats it as though
the MSHRs are full, and so the load must be reattempted
once new resources are available, to hide its execution from
x. To implement this, a thread’s load requests’ timestamps
are propagated up the entire MSHR hierarchy: a load can
fail due to leapfrogs in any MSHR up to main memory.
A special case of leapfrogging, which we call timeleaping,
is when instructions x and y, such that x T=⇒ y but y 6 T=⇒ x,
execute concurrently, with y issuing first, and both attempt
to bring in the same cache line. Here, they can both be
attached to the same MSHR, and so y need not be cancelled
and replayed6. To hide the timing effect, the load is still
leapfrogged: it is restarted at each cache. As with standard
leapfrogging, this may cause cascading leapfrogs, in this
case of the same request, in multiple different cache levels.
This achieves the same timing response as if only x executed
the load, which since x T=⇒ y may validly forward the result
to y.
4.6 Coherence
Timing data can also leak through influencing coherence pro-
tocol states [34]. Between threads, no Strictness Order exists
in general (section 3). This means that coherence states,
either in non-speculative caches or in other GhostMinions,
must not be altered until an instruction commits.
GhostMinion uses a technique taken from MuonTrap [1],
which is sufficient to avoid altering non-speculative coher-
ence state, and avoid observing timing effects from spec-
ulative state. A block within a GhostMinion can only be
in Shared or Invalid7. A Shared block can only exist in a
GhostMinion provided no Exclusive/Modified blocks sit in
non-local parts of the cache hierarchy; that is, caches not
along a direct path from the CPU to Main Memory, for ex-
ample in a private (non-speculative) cache of another core.
Loads that would violate this wait until non-speculative, fill-
ing directly into the L1, before they can gain a coherent
copy.
Equivalently, if a line exists in exclusive or modified in a
localised part of the non-speculative cache (for example, a
private L2 or L1), a valid copy cannot exist, in a GhostMinion
or in a non-speculative cache, down any other part of the
hierarchy. This means any upgrade (for example, to perform
a store) need only invalidate GhostMinions on paths closer
to a CPU than such a copy, in a method timing-insensitive
to the speculative contents of a GhostMinion [1].
Outside the coherence protocol itself, GhostMinion can
forward a speculative non-coherent copy of a value, in Ex-
clusive or Modified in a non-local part of the cache hier-
archy, to the GhostMinion. On an attempt to commit an
6If x literally takes the same MSHR, and thus prioritises the taking of
a particular MSHR based on whether x and y match, then leapfrogging
should otherwise occur on the highest timestamped MSHR to avoid breaking
Temporal Order. If we instead used a random eviction policy of MSHRs
for any timestamp above x’s, an instruction z using another MSHR, which
believed there was still free space, could learn that the addresses of x
and y match even if x T=⇒ z T=⇒ y and y 6 T=⇒ z 6 T=⇒ x, if it were therefore never
leapfrogged.
7The ReadExclusive memory request necessary for stores can only occur
once the store becomes non-speculative [1]. Stores already typically occur
at commit, since they are challenging to roll back, and do not sit on critical
paths unlike loads, due to the store buffering permissible in conventional
TSO and relaxed consistency models.
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instruction using this non-coherent copy, the load is replayed
non-speculatively, and the instruction itself re-executed if
the value has subsequently changed. This technique is taken
from InvisiSpec [38], which uses it for all speculative loads.
If the load originally received a valid shared copy, rather than
a value-predicted version, and can thus commit without this
check, and no shared copy existed in any non-local part of
the non-speculative hierarchy, the L1 cache may then issue a
decoupled upgrade [1] to move the data into exclusive.
4.7 Prefetching
To avoid information leakage, prefetchers in non-speculative
parts of the cache hierarchy can only be trained on non-
speculative input. To achieve this, speculative memory ac-
cesses are tagged with the cache level they were brought in
from. On commit, not only is the value (if relevant) brought
in to the GhostMinion, committed to the L1, a prefetcher no-
tification is also sent to the level it was brought in from (and
any levels closer to the CPU), provided it has a prefetcher at
that level. Again, this technique is inspired by MuonTrap [1].
Prefetchers can only be trained using data from specu-
lative streams if they prefetch into the GhostMinion. For
prefetchers close to the CPU, such as fetch-directed instruc-
tion prefetching [26], this may be desirable. These prefetches
are timestamped to the value of the last instruction used as
input to the prefetcher: only instructions with equal or higher
timestamp can observe the prefetches.
4.8 Instruction GhostMinion
The instruction cache can also be affected by transient execu-
tion attacks. These can be caused in two ways. Branches can
be speculatively resolved not only by lookup in the predictor
and branch target buffer, but also as a result of computa-
tion (for example, a branch or branch target conditional on
the value of a secret). Alternatively, secrets can generate a
contention effect on instruction-fetch progress.
Because instruction fetch is executed in (speculative) pro-
gram order, protection is easier than for the data hierarchy,
since no instruction reordering can occur, so for a pipeline’s
concurrently executing instructions, Temporal Order cannot
be broken via passing information backwards-in-time. We
need only worry about leaking information from the end of
misspeculation to the start of re-execution. Still, we must be
able to return to a cache state unaffected by wrong specula-
tion, and in a timing-invariant way that does not reveal how
much state was changed. This requires being able to wipe an
instruction GhostMinion with a parallel invalidate operation,
like for a data GhostMinion. Further, if y 6 T=⇒ x, then y cannot
evict x’s cache line unless x has been committed. We handle
this via TimeGuarding (section 4.4), and in practice, the
instruction GhostMinion is similar to the data GhostMinion
mentioned above, without coherence requirements.
4.9 Remaining Channels
Though for a system to truly be transient side-channel free,
the entire system must obey Strictness Order, the techniques
here are sufficient to prevent load forwarding, either forwards
or backwards in time, being used to extract such an attack.
Further, since the cache system is the most complex holder
of speculatively updated soft state, it is responsible for the
vast majority of overheads in mitigation. We argue here
that for other system components, the overhead of providing
Strictness Order is likely to be negligible, and that we can
reuse techniques developed here or elsewhere.
Within-core structural hazards Strictness Order can be
violated by a resource anywhere within the core being taken
by a misspeculated instruction, delaying the scheduling of
an instruction that will be committed. For single-cycle or
pipelined operations, the solution is simple: we can prioritise
instructions with lower timestamp. For multi-cycle opera-
tions that can cause structural hazards [5, 10, 39] schedul-
ing can be done in Strictness Order via TimeGuarding. Al-
ternatively, scheduling could be done optimistically, with
leapfrogging used to cancel operations if Strictness Order
is violated. We implemented the former in our gem5 simu-
lation, such that functional units that are not pipelined (in
our case, the IntDiv, FloatDiv, and FloatSqrt units) may only
be issued a speculative operation once all previous specula-
tive operations in timestamp order, that may use the same
unit, have issued. This means that all IntDivs, for example,
are executed in (speculative) program order with respect to
each other. This causes no non-negligible slowdown in any
workload we evaluated (maximum 0.08%). In fact, we saw
a slight speedup on some workloads (4% geomean on SPEC
CPU2006, and 2% on SPECspeed 2017). This is unsurpris-
ing; non-pipelined functional units are rarely part of address
calculation for loads, and so are unlikely to be improved
by long-scale reordering, and by favoring the scheduling
of earlier operations, we cause entries to leave the reorder
buffer more quickly. Since this shows a speedup, not a slow-
down, we do not include this cost saving in the rest of the
evaluation, to avoid masking overheads of other mitigations.
Load-Store Queue Here, protection is simpler than for the
cache; it is naturally designed to transmit data in forwards-
program order, thus providing Temporal Order for data flow.
Still, to protect against the opposite (data not flowing when
it otherwise should, via contention), TimeGuarding (sec-
tion 4.4) and leapfrogging (section 4.5) can be used.
Transient contention from multiple threads Because no
total ordering exists for concurrently executing instructions
on multiple threads, leapfrogging cannot be used to hide
contention between them, particularly on MSHR resources
in shared caches. Data-oblivious execution [39] presents one
solution to this, where each instruction has a predicted use
of such resources, and must repeat once non-speculative if
this prediction is incorrect. Still, the concept of Strictness
Order makes this problem much simpler. As it provides a
method of avoiding timing leakage in the wrong order within
a thread, it vastly simplifies the prediction complexity. In-
stead of needing to predict for every instruction, Strictness
Order makes predicting resource utilisation per thread suf-
ficient to avoid leakage. This allows simple macro-level
allocation based on recent committed behaviour to be used
for shared resources. For simultaneous multi-threaded sys-
tems, cross-thread instruction port contention [6] can be
prevented similarly.
Address translation GhostMinions should also be at-
tached to TLBs [1] and page table walker caches. Behaviour
is similar to those developed here, without coherence protec-
tion.
DRAM contention Speculation-hiding techniques in the
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literature disallow speculative DRAM accesses entirely [39]
or keep them out of scope [1, 38]. The biggest issue is open-
page policies acting as an implicit cache. Still, allowing
only non-speculative accesses to leave pages open may be
feasible, since they are most useful with the spatially local
accesses from prefetchers rather than the out-of-order core.
Other soft state: There are many structures that store
soft state within systems, such as branch predictors, branch
target buffers, and even frequency-voltage scaling [31]. Un-
like with the cache, we believe there is little need to up-
date these with speculative values, and so Strictness Order
should in general be achieved by only updating them non-
speculatively.
4.10 Optimizations
This proof-of-concept microarchitecture, implementing Tem-
poral Order, leaves potential optimisations on the table.
Early Commit Instead of treating instructions as spec-
ulative until commit (as in GhostMinion, MuonTrap [1],
InvisiSpec-Future [38] and STT-Future [40]), instructions
could be treated as non-speculative provided their branches
are resolved (as in InvisiSpec-Spectre [38] and STT-
Spectre [40]). This requires some more tracking within
the processor, and stops any inherent protection against ex-
ception attacks [21], but these may be dealt with via other
means [32].
Full Strictness Order The Temporal Order that Ghost-
Minion implements is, though simple, more restrictive than
necessary. To support Strictness Order, rather than labelling
each individual instruction with a new timestamp, this could
instead be done by assigning a new timestamp after each
speculatively predicted branch instruction (or more gener-
ally, operation that has the potential to fault). To extract
further performance, groups with differing timestamps could
be merged when intermediate speculation is resolved.
4.11 Summary
Here we have presented GhostMinion, a cache system de-
signed to obey Temporal Order, a simple version of Strictness
Order. To avoid any information leakage to concurrent in-
structions that violate this order, we have introduced a variety
of techniques to make such instructions’ behaviour visible
when in a permitted order, and invisible otherwise: this is
greatly simplified by the fact that Strictness Order is total for
a pipeline’s execution, and thus for any two instructions, at
least one can see the effects of the other.
5 Experimental Setup
We use gem5 [8] to model the high-performance Aarch64
system in table 1. This is based on the default out-of-
order setup in gem5 also used in previous Spectre de-
fenses [1, 38, 40]. We simulate SPEC CPU2006 [14] in
syscall emulation mode, fast forwarding for 1 billion in-
structions, then running for 1 billion. SPECspeed 2017 is
fast-forwarded for 10 billion, to account for longer initial-
ization, for workloads that would run in gem5. Parsec [7]
(sim-medium) is run in full-system mode on four threads, to
completion, for workloads that compile on Aarch64. Perfor-
mance breakdowns are performed on SPEC CPU2006, as
this shows the highest overhead. Results for InvisiSpec [38],
Core
Core 4-Core, 8-Wide, Out-of-order, 2.0GHz
Pipeline 192-Entry ROB, 64-entry IQ, 32-entry
LQ, 32-entry SQ, 256 Int / 256 FP regis-
ters, 6 Int ALUs, 4 FP ALUs, 2 Mult/Div
ALU
Tournament 2-bit, 2048-entry local, 8192 global,
Predictor 8192 choice, 4096 BTB, 16 RAS
Caches with GhostMinions
L1 ICache 32KiB, 2-way, 2-cycle latency, 4 MSHRs
L1 DCache 64KiB, 2-way, 2-cycle latency, 4 MSHRs
D/I GhostMinions 2KiB, 2-way, accessed with I/D cache
Rest of system
L2 Cache 2MiB, shared, 8-way, 20-cycle latency, 20
MSHRs, stride prefetcher (64-entry RPT)
Memory DDR3-1600 11-11-11
OS Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
Table 1: System experimental setup.
STT [40] and MuonTrap [1], on the same Aarch64 setup, are
compared against.
6 Evaluation
The performance overheads of GhostMinion are minimal for
most workloads (2.5% geomean on SPEC CPU2006, 0% Par-
sec, 0.6% SPECspeed 2017). Though the worst case is 30%,
this is a fundamental to hiding incorrect speculation rather
than specific to GhostMinion. The prevention of backwards-
in-time channels, via TimeGuarding and leapfrogging, rarely
affects performance, as such flow is rare.
6.1 Comparison
Figure 6 shows the performance of GhostMinion on SPEC
CPU2006 relative to other techniques in the literature. Fig-
ure 7 shows the same on 4-thread Parsec, and Figure 8 on
SPECspeed 2017. While InvisiSpec [38] follows a similar
strategy of hiding speculative loads (in a Load-Store Queue
rather than a cache, and without precise Strictness Order
guarantees, making it vulnerable to Speculative Interfer-
ence [5]), its overheads are much higher: this is mainly down
to the coherence protocol requiring a repeated load when an
instruction becomes non-speculative before it is allowed to
commit, unlike GhostMinion’s MuonTrap-like technique [1]
which takes such operations off of the critical path. This
is despite GhostMinion allowing the use of set-associative
structures in a leak-free way via TimeGuarding, and without
redundant copies of a cache line for every load-queue entry.
GhostMinion follows the same threat model as InvisiSpec-
Future rather than InvisiSpec-Spectre, in that all operations
are considered unsafe until commit time, rather than until all
branches have been decided (but not exceptions). This has
little impact on the performance of GhostMinion, because
few critical-path operations must wait until commit.
The speculation-hiding mechanism of GhostMinion, made
safe using the Strictness Order-based TimeGuarding and
leapfrogging, allows more permissive execution of pro-
grams than the speculation-prevention mechanisms within






















































































































































Figure 7: The performance overhead of GhostMinion on 4-
thread Parsec, versus various techniques from the literature.
cesses, such as those based on another speculative (tainted)
load, to occur once all previous branches have been decided.
There are many workloads, such as astar, gamess, gromacs,
libquantum, namd, omnetpp and xalancbmk, where STT
shows large overheads when GhostMinion shows none at all.
Despite offering stronger guarantees than MuonTrap [1],
a technique that hides speculative memory accesses in an
L0 filter cache, rather than a parallel structure next to the
L1, GhostMinion outperforms both MuonTrap techniques
on SPEC CPU2006, and outperforms MuonTrap-Flush on
Parsec and SPECspeed 2017. MuonTrap is designed primar-
ily as a cross-process defence, though with an optional flush
post-misspeculation (MuonTrap-Flush). Even though one of
GhostMinion’s mechanisms to support Strictness Order is
this same flush, the placement of GhostMinion next to the
L1 cache, with access in parallel, is better suited to frequent
flushing than an L0 filter cache is, where the latter is often
empty, and thus serves only to increase the access latency of
the L1 data/instruction caches. Since a GhostMinion does
not store values already in the attached L1, it can be smaller
and less associative than a MuonTrap.
Some workloads still show significant overhead with a
GhostMinion. Mcf in SPEC CPU2006 shows almost 30%
overhead. MuonTrap’s base system shows no overhead here,
whereas STT-Spectre and MuonTrap-Flush show similar
overhead to GhostMinion, with other techniques higher. The
base MuonTrap is the only technique that allows access
to data brought in via misspeculation past the point of the
processor restarting execution: MuonTrap-Flush and Ghost-
Minion clear it, InvisiSpec makes it invisible through its
Load-Store queue, and STT doesn’t execute dangerous loads
at all. What this suggests is that mcf, and other workloads
such as bzip2, gcc, gobmk, soplex, wrf and zeusmp, rely on
this incorrect speculation to do useful prefetching work, and
so any safe mechanism must prevent it and lose the relevant
performance gains. To improve this, we would require more
accurate speculation, or a (speculation-safe) prefetcher able
to target complex memory accesses.
6.2 Analysis of Overheads
Figure 9 breaks down the overheads of each part of the full
GhostMinion on SPEC CPU2006. Here, we see that most
of the performance overhead comes from both the data-side
GhostMinion, and the coherence protocol extensions, with
a smaller contribution from the prefetcher (helping lbm by
presenting a stabler pattern, and hindering others by affecting
timeliness) and none from the instruction side.
Gcc, leslie3d and mcf are hurt by the lack of access to
misspeculated data on the data-side, as is wrf in SPECspeed
2017. Still, a DMinion improves performance slightly on
workloads such as gamess, GemsFDTD, tonto, povray, and
particularly libquantum. This is down to reduced conflict
misses, particularly when part of the active set is used repeat-
edly in the DMinion before it is committed (and thus evicts
the conflicting sets). Still, this rare speedup is brittle; we see
for Libquantum that, if either the coherence or prefetcher
mechanisms are added, the improvement disappears.
6.3 TimeGuarding and Leapfrogging
The overheads from protecting against backwards-in-time
channels within current speculative state, as opposed to lack
of resource in the GhostMinion or clearing on misspecula-
tion, rarely affect benign code. As seen in fig. 9, the extra
overhead is 0.2%, with a worst case of 2.5%. Figure 10
shows the proportion of memory requests that experience
TimeGuarding in the GhostMinion, to prevent access to a
cache line brought in by a future memory request, those that
experience timeleaping, where a memory request currently
in the MSHRs would deliver data backwards in time, and
leapfrogging, where limited miss status handling registers
(MSHR) resources are taken in the wrong order, and there-




















































































































































Figure 9: Breakdown of overheads from GhostMinion. Dminion-Timeless shows a GhostMinion with no concept of
timestamping, but still wiped on misspeculation, so able to protect against standard Spectre attacks but not backwards-
in-time attacks. The DMinion, IMinion and combined techniques are relative to an unprotected system; for Coherence /
Prefetcher, the lighter bars show overhead (with DMinion enabled) relative to the baseline, and the darker bars relative to
the DMinion alone.
tamps.
All three are uncommon; programs that transmit data
“backwards in time” are unusual. Still, there are exceptions.
Soplex often has timeleaps, or load hits in the MSHRs, which
are waiting for memory accesses to complete, where the
original instruction that caused the MSHR to be allocated is
logically after the new access to the cache in timestamp order,
causing a replay of the load to ensure safety. This may be lim-
ited by more permissive Strictness-Order mechanisms than
the Temporal Order implemented in our prototype. Other
workloads, such as mcf, libquantum, and omnetpp, expe-
rience leapfrogging, caused by a combination of running
out of MSHR resources, and MSHR resources being allo-
cated in an order where later timestamped instructions take
resources that would otherwise be allocated to those with an
earlier timestamp. Still, the overheads could be reduced by
providing more MSHRs in the cache.
6.4 Sizing Sensitivity
Figure 11 shows the performance of GhostMinion with vari-
ous sizes of GhostMinion, where 2KiB is the default. We see
that 4KiB is negligibly faster and 1KiB is negligibly slower.
For some workloads, performance is relatively consistent
regardless of GhostMinion size; most of their working set fits
in the L1, and so use of the GhostMinion is rare in general.









































































































Figure 10: Backwards-in-time prevention is rarely triggered.
of space causes progressively more cache lines to be thrown
away before reaching the non-speculative caches.
Still, from 512B (8 cache lines) or fewer, spikes start to
appear: in particular, povray at 128B, and Xalancbmk at
512B and 256B (but not 128B). In these cases, the Ghost-
Minion is consistently not big enough, and so cache lines
leave the GhostMinion before commit. This means they are
repeatedly brought in from main memory. This can be solved
by asynchronously reloading cache lines that were brought
in to the GhostMinion by a speculative instruction, but are
missing from the L1 cache and GhostMinion at commit
10
time. This eliminates the spikes, and thus allows reasonable
performance even with very small (128B, or 2 cache line)
GhostMinions. For more moderate sizes, this lowers per-
formance, as it causes reload of some values that are never
used again, especially in GemsFDTD and to a lesser extent
in zeusmp, milc and lbm, so we turn it off by default.
6.5 Power Analysis
GhostMinion involves accessing the L1 cache and GhostMin-
ion in parallel, unlike MuonTrap [1] where the speculative-
hiding cache is an L0 filter cache. We have shown in sec-
tion 6.1 that this gives performance improvements when the
speculative cache is frequently cleared, as is necessary for
a comprehensive protection mechanism, but clearly there is
an associated energy cost from the parallel accesses. Still,
the timestamps that allow GhostMinion to safely use set as-
sociativity for its secret structures give significant efficiency
compared with techniques that rely on full associativity or
overprovisioning [16, 38] to hide storage contention.
At 22nm, CACTI [23] places the static power consump-
tion at 0.47mW per 2KiB GhostMinion, versus 12.8mW for
the 64KiB L1 data cache, and read energy at 1.5pJ versus
8.6pJ for the L1 data cache, due to the latter’s larger size.
The new memory accesses from GhostMinion constitute of
a read access in the GhostMinion for every read in the L1,
a write for every line brought into the GhostMinion, and a
read for every cache line brought into the GhostMinion and
then committed into the L1. While some of this could be
reduced by a form of way prediction to only access one of
the two structures, provided this maintained the Strictness
Order guarantees, the overhead is already small, with 3µW
maximum dynamic power draw for data, and 1µW for in-
structions, across SPEC CPU2006. Compared with around
1W per core for recent Arm systems [25], the overheads are
negligible.
7 Related Work
Here we discuss existing (micro)architectural mitigations
designed to prevent Spectre attacks. In turn, we consider
how the concept of Strictness Order relates to their operation.
7.1 Speculation Hiding
Speculation-hiding techniques are intended to allow specula-
tion to occur, but hide any effects from being observed by an
attacker. There is varying compliance with Strictness Order,
and thus vulnerability to contention attacks [5, 10].
InvisiSpec [38] appears to offer Temporal Order (defini-
tion 2) for loads only: “InvisiSpec reuses only state allocated
by prior (in program order) instructions, to avoid creating
new side channels.” To avoid incorrect eviction of data from
its structures, it allocates them in program order. This re-
quires overprovisioning, with full cache-line copies per each
word-sized load-queue entry. SafeSpec [16] appears to offer
Strictness Order (definition 1): “Speculative instructions in
the same execution branch as the load that fetched a shadow
cache line... can use the value from the shadow structure.” It
worst-case overprovisions its shadow structures to avoid con-
tention from concurrent execution. Unlike InvisiSpec and
GhostMinion, coherence channels [34] are not protected, and
only GhostMinion handles MSHR and within-core [5, 10]
contention. Temporal Order directly translates into Time-
Guarding in GhostMinion. This allows multiple levels of un-
trusted speculation to coexist within a set-associative cache
structure, without leaking data via presence or absence. It
gives more comprehensive enforcement, and without the
overprovisioning of previous work [16, 38].
Data-oblivious execution [39] makes all speculative in-
structions use a predicted amount of time on resources such
as cache (by level prediction) and FPU (estimated cycle
length). Under Strictness Order, many side channels are per-
mitted without obliviousness: earlier instructions in program
order always allow Strictness-Order transmission to later
ones.
DAWG [17] dynamically partitions cache ways between
distinct domains, such as groups of processes; MuonTrap [1]
prevents the observation of speculative state, brought in to
a filter cache, from affecting other processes, by flushing
limited regions of speculation on context switch, and via co-
herence protocol changes. Neither enforces Strictness Order
even between processes: though a cross-process attacker may
not be able to directly observe speculative state changes, the
timing of context switches and inter-process communication
may still be altered by the effects of misspeculated execution.
GhostMinion’s TimeGuarding provides a direct method to
augment these caches to support hiding concurrent execution,
by preventing information flow backwards-in-time.
Rollback techniques, such as CleanupSpec [27] and Re-
versiSpec [37], permit speculative execution to change the
cache system, and roll it back under misspeculation. These
violate Strictness Order on two counts. The time to roll back
is dependent on the amount of state, which affects restarting
of execution. As exploited in SpectreRewind [10] and Spec-
ulative Interference [5], correct execution, earlier in program
order but concurrent with misspeculated execution, can see
the effects of misspeculation. The latter property affects any
techniques that only clear effects of misspeculation once it is
discovered, such as MuonTrap-Flush [1], Ghost Loads [28],
and Gonzalez et al.’s RISC-V BOOM mitigation [11].
Spectector [12] is a software analysis technique, based on
the concept of speculative non-interference of state leakage.
DOLMA [22] defines a similar property in Transient Non-
Observability. He et al. [13] present the concept of attack
graphs, which model access-control authorization delays
on secret data in order to generate new vulnerabilities and
evaluate defences against them. Strictness Order is a per-
missive constraint that can be used to define hardware that
comprehensively obeys and defends against these properties.
7.2 Speculation Restricting
Alternatively, techniques can restrict speculative behaviour
from occurring at all, rather than hiding its effects. Examples
of such techniques include Speculative Taint Tracking [40],
NDA [36], Selective Delay and Value Prediction [29], Con-
ditional Speculation [20], and SpecShield [4]. Restricting
unsafe speculation is sufficient to achieve Strictness Order,
though it is not necessary. Still, restricting it entirely has
fewer implications on complexity, state-hiding and coher-
ence. To limit performance impact, such techniques violate
Strictness Order in a selective way, for speculative instruc-
tions that can be demonstrated unlikely to leak secrets, for
example not taking input from speculatively loaded data [40].








































































































Figure 11: Slowdown of GhostMinion with different-sized instruction and data minions (2K default, each 2-way assoc.).
Asynchronous reload of lost cache lines (geo. async., where we only show the geomean for brevity) removes the spikes in
performance seen with small GhostMinions, but is inadvisable for systems with ample resources.
croarchitectures can be viewed as a special case: these limit
reordering of instructions around each side of the fence. Still,
these could be implemented, without changing their guaran-
tees, via Strictness Order around the barrier instead.
7.3 Other Techniques
Other more ad-hoc speculation-restriction techniques are
currently in use, such as Retpoline [35], which redirects
branch target flow, though these are harder to give precise
Strictness Order analysis of. Isolation and randomisation
of structures, such as over the branch target buffer [3] and
branch predictor [19], restrict the ability of a cross-domain
attacker from training a victim. Though they do not prevent
attacks where the victim trains itself, and are thus more
suited to protection against Variant 2 [18] than other attacks,
they provide strong probabilistic guarantees rather than full
Strictness Order constraints. Kaiser [32] is another example
of isolation, where Meltdown [21] is prevented by separating
out the kernel and userspace’s page tables, and thus gives
protection outside of Strictness-Order guarantees.
8 Conclusion
We have presented Strictness Ordering, a permissive con-
straint system designed to prevent speculative execution at-
tacks, by comprehensively preventing the timing effects of
mis-speculated instructions from leaking to instructions that
do commit, either executed concurrently or in future. It does
this while still allowing widespread forwarding of specula-
tive information, by noting that, within a thread, the fates
of many speculative instructions are tied together, and that
processors generate instructions that become progressively
more speculative, and so instructions earlier in program order
can always produce side channels for those later.
GhostMinion demonstrates the techniques needed to im-
plement a full microarchitecture without heavy speculation
restriction, while remaining safe via Strictness-Order guar-
antees. By combining Strictness Order and GhostMinion
with prediction for shared speculative resources between
threads [39], and notions of Speculative Taint [40] to further
permissify constraints, we believe systems will finally be
able to rigorously eliminate transient-execution attacks at
acceptable costs, ending this cat-and-mouse game for good.
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